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Reflections On Soviet Russia (2)

by BRYAN W. MONAHAN

[There are, no doubt, many of our readers who have not previously read this review, which was originally published serially in *The Australian Social Crediter* at the end of 1945 and early in 1946. Republication in *The Social Crediter* followed shortly afterwards.]

Quite a brief examination of Stalin's and of other leaders' speeches reveals that these contain a high proportion of emotive words. This is common to most politicians' speeches, not in Russia alone. But for Communism this has a deeper significance. From the tactical point of view, ideology is a basic weapon. Giving a dog a bad name has been reduced, deliberately, to a science; and the formulation of slogans, couched in emotional language, is almost an industry. It is a simple and brilliant technique. The public is taught to dislike a label—in Pavlov's terminology it is conditioned; after that there is no need to explain the merits or demerits of a case; it suffices to attach the appropriate label, and the desired emotional response is forthcoming.

In his brilliant book, *Brave New World*, of which so much seemed to be a caricature of trends that have come to prevail since it was written, Aldous Huxley perhaps made conditioning appear unduly difficult. As Jung had shown, the unconscious is really extraordinarily permeable; that it is so is overlooked precisely because it is unconscious. All day long subliminal impressions are absorbed; and indefinitely later are reproduced as cryptamnesic phenomena. In this way, consciously prepared slogans insinuated into discourse are later reproduced, all unwittingly, as original contributions to a discussion. Such slogans have, in a sense, biological properties of growth like the metastases of a cancer, for a carefully conceived slogan, phrase, or label, grows in the mind of the host, by building new incoming facts and perceptions into an ideological system whose character is determined by the original nucleus of ideological material, buried, all too often, in the Unconscious.

No propagandist could overlook the fact that nowadays the public is more propaganda-conscious; yet propaganda is undoubtedly more effective than ever. It is the propaganda that aims at the Unconscious that counts. Discussion-groups are a case in point. Here, on prepared material, a discussion is started, and allowed to follow almost any course; the opponents of the ideas you wish to insinuate may be allowed or even encouraged to win; your ideological victory lies in having got certain ideas discussed, certain premises implicit in the discussion carried into the unconscious part of the mind.

Using psychological terms, we can usefully distinguish between the 'manifest' and the 'latent' content of propaganda. It is in connection with the latter that the propagandist's art lies. It is the latent content which, unperceived, influences

opinion. There are few people, for example, who do not hold—tenaciously—opinions on Soviet Russia. Yet only a tiny few have been to Russia, or could possibly go, unfortunately. Only a small proportion of the population ever makes any serious endeavour to study what material is available on Russia. Yet, in any discussion, nearly everyone will take sides, and most, indeed, will become emotional about the differences of opinion. That is an indication of unconscious motivation.

Thus even an apparently violently anti-Communist Press serves the ends of the Communists. To some extent it provokes emotional reactions, and these in turn rouse opposition. Label the paper 'reactionary,' or, as does J. B. S. Haldane, who ought to know better, and probably does, 'Fascist,' and this opposition is assisted. "To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction" is a physical law with its equivalent on the psychological plane.

Stalin's emotive words and those of other Soviet and Communist leaders, therefore, require closer attention than those in ordinary political use. They are designed to have international currency. They are important links in the party 'line'—code messages to followers all over the world.

There is a fairly extensive, though not very well-known, literature which takes the revolutionary origins of modern communism back some centuries. But from the time of Marx and Engels there are three well-marked stages. The first, the Marxian description of the evolutionary course of civilisation, regarded the eventual achievement of a classless society as mechanistically inevitable; but the process was to be helped along by the aggravation of class-consciousness. The next stage is that dominated by Lenin, who introduced, and made effective, the concept of a totalitarian 'party'—a small, highly organised, highly centralised group strictly disciplined under a leader. It is, in fact, a purely military concept, and it proved successful in the conquest of Russia, though other factors (such as the release at unknown instigation of Trotsky from prison; the passage into Russia by Germany of Lenin and his associates; and generous finance, largely out of New York) were essential to the outcome.

Lenin thus infused some vitality into the theoretical mechanistic system of Marx. If human societies were in fact mechanisms, their evolution might indeed be predictable on Marxian lines; even so purely mechanistic theories of anything but consciously constructed machines are actually

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Mosaism

It ought to be clear without much elaboration that the 1914-18 and 1939-1945 (?) War had as its primary objective a World Government. There is every evidence that the League of Nations was a primary excitant to war, just as its double, U.N.O., is doing more to make peace impossible than any other single factor-at the moment. Now, it is absurd to say the majority of people wanted either war or UNO—the reaction against both is increasingly violent.

Where is the pressure coming from? Dr. Alfred Nossig, the distinguished Jewish author of *Intergrales Judentum* supplies what appears to be an almost complete answer:

"The modern Socialist movement is in great part the work of the Jews, who impress on it the mark of their brains; it was they who took a prepondering part in the directing of the first Socialist Republic, although the controlling Jewish Socialists were mostly far from Judaism [?] The present word Socialism forms the first step of the accomplishment of Mosaism, the start of the realisation of the future state of the world announced by our prophets. It is not till there shall be a League of Nations; it is not till its Allied Armies shall be employed in an effective manner for the protection of the feeble that we can hope that the Jews will be able to develop without impediment in Palestine, their national State; and equally it is only a League of Nations penetrated with the Socialist spirit that will render possible for us the enjoyment of our international necessities, as well as our national ones . . ."

It would be easy to be flippant about this extract; instead, we commend it to the most serious attention. It is a clear indication of the magnitude of the world's danger.

—C. H. Douglas (1946).

Sound Counsel

"What is the use of running if you are on the wrong road?"—*German Proverb.*

The Congo

The following letter appeared recently in *The Daily Telegraph*, January 18, 1961.—

Sir—A recent edition of the television programme Panorama was advertised as an exposition of the Congo situation. It turned out to be a pretty superficial and partial exercise.

The villains of the piece, of course, were the Belgians; even a sequence showing African police smashing the heads and faces of their compatriots was accompanied by a gratuitous comment that this brutality was "taught them by the Belgians."

Years of experience in Africa have long ago convinced me that Africans, with all their charm and attractive qualities have nothing whatever to learn from anybody concerning brutal treatment of fellow Africans.

The Belgians, too, were sternly reproached for running away from their jobs, and equally reprimanded for returning to them at the request of African authorities.

I hold no brief for the Brussels Government, and no doubt they have made their mistakes in Africa, as we all have. But anyone who believes that the British, or the Americans, or the Russians, have no responsibilities for the pressure that drove the Belgians precipitately out of the Congo is too naive for this world.

As for the young lions of the B.B.C. who deliver themselves on world affairs after a rushed week or two in some distant centre of strife, they would surely be wise to avoid these overtones of moral indignation. The gaps in their experience, and even in their appreciation of facts under their noses, are often too painfully evident.

Yours faithfully,

LEWIS HASTINGS.

Beckington, Som.

Check

These are prices in advertisements in the *Dundee Advertiser*, of 65 years ago:—

Oranges—100 for 3s 6d.

1 dozen case whisky—28s 6d.

Fruit cake, 3 lb.—9½d.

Shortbread—1s 8d per lippie.

Cheese—4½d per lb.

Cigarettes—400 for 8s 9d.

Bacon—4½d per lb.

Indian rugs, 6 ft. by 3 ft.—8s 11d.

Suede gloves—1s 11½d per pair.

Imitation daffodils—8½d per dozen.

Music Hall at People's Palace—Admission 3d upwards.

CORRECTION ("Hunting to Live", p. 4, *The Social Crediter*, Feb., 18 1961). We greatly regret the difficulties which must have been occasioned to readers by the omission of a line and the telescoping of two paragraphs into one.

The line is omitted at "threefold élite" in line 4, which should end the first paragraph. A second paragraph should then begin:

"His thesis appears to be as follows. There are the official sociologically recognised élite,"—and continue as in line 4, "the ruling classes and also an esoteric élite comparable with the early Christians."

REFLECTIONS ON SOVIET RUSSIA

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proving inadequate; even physics has been transformed from a purely mechanistic system.

Lenin's essential ideas were carried forward into the third stage under Stalin. The cohesion of Soviet Russia, as a collectivity, is the result of the conscious and purposeful efforts of the inner section of the Communist Party, which formulates and promulgates the party 'line.' Stalin himself even before the war, regarded the inner core of the Party as a General Staff. But the important feature which distinguishes the third stage is the possession of an army, and the organisation of the community to supply it. The international party 'line,' therefore, has become incorporated in a foreign policy, backed by the necessary sanctions.

The party 'line,' however is just as much a reality as ever. Communist groups, both inside and outside Russia, are organised under their Secretaries, who in most respects are the equivalent of the German Gauleiters, and not at all equivalent to the ordinary concept of a secretary. At first sight it might appear that Hitler had taken his ideas for the organisation of Germany from Lenin; in fact, it is more probable that a common root for the ideas of both is to be found in the Great German General Staff which, like the Communist Party, and independently of Hitlerism as such, had subsidiary organisations all over the world, though much less obviously.* The objective of the German General Staff, like that of the Russian Politbureau, was the promotion of centralisation of authority and power in every country—industrial centralisation through the promotion first of national monopolies,† and secondly of international cartels;‡ political centralisation through State control, *via* Socialisation; and economic through social 'security' schemes, the intention of which is to extend beyond the normal working span the principle of wage-slavery—that is to say, 'security' is provided on conditions, and is revocable by authority; it therefore diminishes independence. That this is so can be seen by the provision, in both the Beveridge scheme and the British Government modification of it, that the right to a pension is forfeited if the individual by his initiative earns more than £1 per week; and by many other provisions, none of which is found in private insurance. Thus 'British' Socialism is, to paraphrase Bernard Shaw, "only Communism going slow."

This convergence of German socialism and Russian Communism is a most important phenomenon. Its significance can be grasped from a careful study of F. A. Hayek's *The Road to Serfdom*, in which the author makes it clear not only that the socialistic doctrines at present being preached in Great Britain and the British Empire have the effect of subordinating the individual to the State, but that those doctrines were "made in Germany," and were the essential foundation of the later totalitarian system.

The chief fount of these doctrines in England is the

* and ‡ See, for example, evidence presented to the sub-committee of the (U.S.) Senate Military Affairs Committee by Orvis Schmidt, director of Foreign Funds Control of the U.S. Treasury (reported in *The Canberra Times* of September 5, 1945).

† "This concentration and centralisation of national economy will not and cannot be undone. To propose and discuss breaking up this development is an occupation only for chatterboxes"—Earl Browder: *Teheran—Our Path in Peace and War*. (Note the use of one of Stalin's epithets to characterise the presumed opposition).

London School of Political and Economic Science, of which Sir Ernest Cassel (of German origin) said that his intention in endowing it was to make it the training ground for the bureaucracy which would run the future Socialist State.** The School includes many teachers of German origin, busily engaged in endeavouring to promote the German social system in England; and teachers who are either, like Professor Laski, frank Communists working for revolution, or crypto-Communists. The graduates of the School become economic advisers to banks and governments. The *effective* policy which they believe in and promote is more and more centralisation of economic and political power, which suited both Germany and Russia.

If Germany had beaten Russia, she would not have abolished the apparatus of State control built up by Lenin and Stalin, simply because it is an efficient organ of central control of the population. Russia, having beaten Germany, is quite naturally retaining the Nazi *apparatus*, but is changing the personnel staffing it. This fulfils Stalin's warning that Hitlers come and Hitlers go, but the German people and the German State remain, as a matter of Soviet policy.

This makes clear the significance of the third-stage Communism of Stalin. As in Germany, so in other territories passed over by the Red Army. They all contained Communist Parties; but the extra-Russian organisation of these parties is, as Trotsky realised, no longer revolutionary as such. It is in each country, firstly a fifth-column, and secondly, the skeleton organisation for the central control of the community. Because Communism now has a national locus, it has become a foreign policy backed by force.

Although there is a great deal of deliberate confusion about Soviet Russia, there is no real mystery. The confusion is part of the technique of her foreign policy, and results from ideological warfare (German psychological warfare).

Reports of various congresses, Stalin's speeches, and official publications, not to mention local Communist 'manuals of instruction,' for the converts, as distinct from the propagandist literature for the general public, are available to those with the energy to read them, and they make no secret of aims or methods. The few besides the Communists who master them are easily neutralised as effective opposition by the perfected technique of attaching a label—Fascist, for example, or anti-Semitic. These labels are sure to be taken up, because they are easy and convenient, by the rather lazy modern journalist, who, regarding himself as the moulder of public opinion rather than as a reporter of facts, finds in the scientifically devised Communist slogans and catchwords just what he needs to produce an effortless flow of copy and an illusion of erudition.

Soviet Russia, then, is a politically autonomous country of immense but relatively slightly developed resources, ruled through the agency of a small, highly organised, highly trained 'General Staff' of which the present Chief of Staff is Generalissimo Stalin, by the *idea* of a single World State. This ruling idea is not original to Communism (*cf.* Bismarck—"We march separately, but we fight together"), but at the moment the Russian exemplification of it seems to be in the lead. However, the German General Staff, and particularly the extra-German territorial portion of it, has not yet been disposed of; hence, presumably, Hitler's re-iteration in the

** *Quarterly Review*, January, 1929.

face of obvious military defeat that Germany would win in the end.

To subserve this world-conquering idea the population of Russia, which is treated by the leaders like cattle, is organised into an Army, and an industrial army supplying it. Considerations of economic efficiency are subordinated to those of effective control. For example, since 'proletarians' are more easily controlled than peasants, agriculture has been collectivised. The proletarian population required to supply tractors and other agricultural machinery, fuel, raw materials and the transport required to bring all these things together and to distribute them to the collective farms, is really a division of the agricultural population;† but as workers they are wage-slaves and dependent on the Government for the organisation of their food-supplies, and are therefore far more controllable than peasants living on the land.

Foreign policy is based on realities, and it is a reality that Russia constitutes a large, powerful, autonomous nation. Despite the appalling cost of the war to her, she has emerged with greater spoils, evidently has hopes of others, and has gained vast practical experience.

To those outside her boundaries, it makes little difference whether her foreign policy is based on fear of 'Capitalist' attacks, as she says it is, or on ideas of world conquest. The fact, and it is all that matters, is that *if any country acquires such masses of population, such control of raw materials, and such total organisation of the population as would render futile resistance to an act of aggression should it occur, then that country is in a position to dominate the world.* Such supercentralisation is in itself a menace to the independence of every other country, quite apart from any ideological considerations. It therefore must be opposed *before* it becomes irresistible, because a changed government may have a changed ideology, and find ready to its purposes the instrument of aggression, just as Frederic the Great inherited his father's pet army.

The case is worse, however, when ideology is already a weapon. Stalin once said "Words must have no relation to actions—otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it? Words are one thing, actions another. Good words are a mask for the concealment of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or wooden iron." At a Press Conference at San Francisco during the United Nations Conference, Mr. Manuilsky, formerly head of the Comintern, and now Foreign Secretary of the Republic of the Ukraine, expressed the same opinion. He said: "We are political men, and at different times, and on different questions, we put forward different statements." This admission, remarkable on such an occasion, was to serve to explain why an act was right for the Soviet Government, but wrong for the Polish.

The only effective guarantee of non-aggression is economic and political decentralisation, and if centralisation is persisted in and increased, that is a more important fact than the verbal diplomacy which accompanies it.

Of course, the same considerations apply to an International Authority; if this is to control sanctions on a sufficient scale to stop Russia, or any other candidate that otherwise would be assured of world victory, *ipso facto* that Authority potentially controls the world. Of its very nature it must be a centralised organisation, and therefore susceptible of capture by an autonomous group. For example, it cannot

be proved that the Great German General Staff has not foreseen this possibility, just as it foresaw the uses to which it could put the League of Nations, and did.* It is impossible to prove that all 'naturalised' Germans, many of them in key positions in Great Britain and the United States, in Government, business, finance and cartels, and some of them prominent Internationalists, are completely de-germanised. The continuity of the German policy of world conquest, of which the military episodes are only phases—"War is the pursuit of policy by other means," as Clausewitz defined it—is promoted most consistently by means of cartelisation in the economic sphere, and by the construction of bureaucracy everywhere where the German system of social 'security'—*i.e.*, central control and registration of the whole community—is adopted. We must look at these questions from a much more general point of view than is provided by a consideration of the few years of the Nazi Party. The German General Staff was *behind* Hitler, and has existed at least from the time of Frederick the Great. War, irrespective of military victory or defeat, furthers the underlying Pan-German policy to the extent that German ideas of organisation are furthered by it. In a possibly unguarded moment, Hitler admitted as much.

The problems raised by the existence of Soviet Russia are therefore the crucial problems at the present juncture. They are made more acute by the fusion of Germany and Russia which is going on at present. They are the problems raised by the existence of any huge centralised military bloc. For but for that there would be no need for an International Authority on an even greater scale, a permanent temptation to some group to seize control of it to impose on the world its conception of how the world should be run.

The autonomous units of the world are being gradually reduced to two, and if the process continues these must fight in the end. The victor would be in possession of the prize of the ages—world control.

(To be continued)

* See *Geneva Versus Peace*, by Comte de St. Aulaire.

Privilege

Diplomatic privileges have been conferred on the International Atomic Energy Agency and its members by the Governor-General, Lord Cobham, through an Order-in-Council.

The order was made at Government House, Wellington, on October 26th, with the approval of the Executive Council.

The agency now has the legal capacities of a corporate body. It has immunity from legal process, except where the immunity is waived.

High officers of the agency have a like immunity from legal process. The agency's official premises and archives have the same rights to inviolability as have those of foreign envoys.

The agency and its members have been conceded certain tax exemptions. The order also applies in the Cook Islands, the Tokelau Islands and Western Samoa.

New Zealand Herald, November 2, 1960.

† See D. J. Dallin, *The Real Soviet Russia*.