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Communism, Czechoslovakia, and the West*

By BRIAN W. MONAHAN

There has been a curious uniformity of comment on the occupation of Czechoslovakia by Russian and other Warsaw Pact troops. This is in remarkable contrast to the type of comment which developed before the Munich Agreement which, we were told, meant "peace in our time". Few believed that. The menace to all Europe, and indeed to the world, of a fully-armed Germany, totally organised for war, and with the advantage of internal lines of communication, was obvious for all to see. What is the situation now?

Current comment holds that Russia has committed a terrible blunder. The brutal and frightened leaders in the Kremlin have learned nothing and forgotten everything. They have jeopardised the good-will of the West, and of every civilised country. They are insane, risking a thermo-nuclear war which would inevitably destroy them, as well as most of the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, they have done what they have done. Why?

Adolf Hitler exposed his intentions in his book *Mein Kampf*. Yet, up to the time of the Munich Agreement, comment on the world situation was dominated in the main by speculation. Correspondents' reports (such as those of Douglas Reed) on the progress of German rearmament were largely ignored, or discounted. Pacifism was sufficiently potent to deter the British Government from openly arming to meet the threat (but it cannot be supposed that what steps that Government did take were not fully reported by the German intelligence system; it was British public opinion which enjoined secrecy). After Munich, it was a race against time; and in the event, enough time was gained to build up a sufficient force of fighter aircraft to win the Battle of Britain, and thus gain further time to *prepare* for the ultimate defeat of Germany and German ambitions. Had Britain succumbed, there would have been no base for U.S. intervention.

Were German ambitions *really* those of world conquest? I believe a sufficiently convincing answer to be found in Derwent Whittlesey's *German Strategy of World Conquest*. This book investigates the question: "Is this strategy a creation of the Nazi Party and the leaders in geopolitics, or is it derived from a long-range urge to subjugate Europe and dominate the world?" The answer found is "that theories of geopolitics, the ambitions of Hitler, and the entire Nazi doctrine, with its initial successes, are parts of a gigantic, carefully designed scheme of world conquest, worked out with ruthless precision, and that its roots, far from being shallow, find the sources of their nourishment deep in the soil of Germany's past".

This, however, is not to say that they had their *origins* in Germany.

Hitler, and indeed the whole Nazi apparatus, were epiphenomena; the underlying reality was the prior and continuing existence of the Great German General Staff, which incorporated in its long-term strategy the geopolitical theories of the English geographer Halford Mackinder (1904). World War II was the resumption of World War I.

The general concept of geopolitics is that Central Europe, including European Russia and the Middle East, constitutes a territorial Heartland, from which world conquest can be achieved by expansion outward with interior lines of communication. A simplified map of Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Mediterranean, drawn within a circle having a radius of 1,600 miles and the centre at Odessa on the Black Sea, brings out the strategic implications of this concept with startling clarity.

But a far more important book than *Mein Kampf* is J. Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism*. In this is laid out the Communist strategy of world conquest, characterised by Lenin as "a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeois, a war which is a hundred times more difficult, prolonged and complicated than the most stubborn of ordinary wars between states". And of this war, Khrushchev said: "We Communists want to win this struggle with the least losses, and there is no doubt whatsoever that we shall win . . . without unleashing a world thermo-nuclear war".

I believe it is supremely important at this time to put aside the Marxian economic theories of class conflict, and consider the more purely military-strategic concepts of Lenin, as set out by Stalin. The basic concept is that the population of the globe is divided into two opposing 'armies' confronting each other—on the one side the bourgeoisie (property-owning citizens) led by Capitalists, on the other the proletariat, now led by the Communist Party. This concept cuts across the idea of Nation-States, whose territories are the squares on a chess-board, and whose peoples are pawns and other pieces on that board.

The Leninist idea is that sooner or later, this confrontation would be disturbed by the proletariat breaking through the bourgeoisie line at some point. Once this happens, the nature of the struggle changes, for the victorious segment of the proletariat becomes the leader of the rest of the world-proletariat, and strategy alters accordingly.

This stage was reached with the victorious Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and Stalin describes the appropriate strategy as follows:

"Objective: to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow

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*This survey, an extended version of "Instant Danger" (T.S.C., Oct. 5) was offered to, but not accepted by *The Canberra Times*.

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FROM WEEK TO WEEK

Mr. Enoch Powell, as reported in the *Times* of Sept. 19, 1968, "scorns" an east-of-Suez role for Britain, on the grounds that it arose only out of the British connection with India. Today, says Mr. Powell, there is no India, and no route to India. But he also says: "Twice in our life-time we have been all but overwhelmed by a military power located 200-miles away." The defence of Britain required "that the minimum external communications, essential in war, should be secure, and that the Continent be denied to any enemy so far as he might use it to attack the British Isles, or in the worst case that such an attack should be repelled". And he dismisses the presence of Russian warships in the Mediterranean as "no more remarkable and no more alarming than the appearance of Russian warships in the Skaggerak".

Sir John Glubb (Glubb Pasha), thoroughly familiar through practical military experience with Middle East realities, writes in his little (but profound) book *The Middle East Crisis* (1967): "The two World Wars ended in victory for the Western Allies because Britain held Egypt and naval command of the Mediterranean. In these circumstances, Germany, like Napoleon, could not win the war, no matter how great her land victories."

Who could be Mr. Powell's "any enemy" which might use the Continent to threaten Britain? And when?

It is Communist Russia's claim, not ours, that they expect to take over the whole world for Communism. This would inevitably involve the conquest of Europe, "from the Atlantic to the Urals" in de Gaulle's words. The opinion that this cannot be done rests on two assumptions: that the possibility of the use of atomic weapons will deter the attempt, and that in the last resort, short of nuclear deterrence the U.S.A. will not allow it.

U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 16, 1968, summarises the official findings of a special subcommittee of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee. It found: "While Soviet strength is mounting, American forces in troubled Europe are found to be in a 'marginal state of readiness', with no improvement in sight.

"The U.S. Army in Europe is short of combat troops, new weapons, major items of equipment, trained officers.

"The Air Force is short of aircraft, air crews, dispersed airfields, and storage facilities."

The report of the subcommittee, which was compiled over the course of almost a year, was based on more than 5,000 pages of testimony. Bearing in mind the facilities to U.S. House Committees (and subcommittees), it must surely be regarded as as authoritative as anything we are likely to find in these days of slanted reporting.

In the light of this, *can* the Continent be denied to any enemy so far as he might use it to attack the British Isles? Is the presence of Russian warships in the Mediterranean unremarkable? *U.S. News* notes, from the subcommittee's report, the U.S.'s "capacity to keep two carriers in the Mediterranean 'is being stretched to the limit' ". How soon can that capacity be extended to the point of safety?

From the subcommittee's report, "heavily consored as to many specific shortages", but noting a shortage of "major items of equipment" and a depletion of stockpiles, it appears to be an inescapable conclusion that "any enemy" of the British Isles has an unprecedented opportunity of using the Continent for an attack. If there is no enemy, it does not matter. But if there is an enemy, is he going to sit by passively and see his opportunity eroded?

It is, perhaps, worth recalling that the Soviets regard British and U.S. troops in Europe as *hostages*. Since the Soviets do not appear to be short of major items of equipment, and have moved stockpiles to the very borders of West Germany, it is not difficult to see what they mean, and what the situation means to the British.

Wilson's Irregulars

The very people who are supposed to benefit from international Fabianism evidently find it far from their taste. John Bulloch writes an article called "Safari Against Terror" (*Daily Telegraph*, Aug. 13, 1968) in which he says that "regular terrorist incursions have now become a fact of life in Rhodesia". Yet a lieutenant told him that "the local people fear and dislike the terrorists as much as we do". This means that an undeclared war has been launched against Rhodesia and that those who train the terrorists, in Cuba, Russia or China, are sending them to promote their own foreign interests, while the tribesmen recognise that the present régime is infinitely preferable to the freedom to murder, rape and burn and are in fact backing the régime by their actions and showing that Mr. Smith represents the people. As Mr. Bulloch concludes, "the tribesmen are on the side of the security forces, the soldiers and policemen who settle their disputes, bring medicine for their children and animals and protect them from the 'liberators'—who believe in intimidation to get their way".

We also find the B.B.C. (or anti-B.B.C.)'s programme "Cause for Concern", which slandered the London police, hotly resented by a brilliant Indian, J. Chinna Durai, who asks, "Do they realise the harm they are doing to the cause of justice. . . . In my 44 years' experience as an Indian lawyer resident in this country I have not come across anything like the allegations against the police made in this programme. . . . The effect of B.B.C. programmes has been to aggravate tension and promote bad feelings".

Nor are the new countries solving their problems any better. Ahmed Seif Kharusi, of the Zanzibar Organisation,

complains of the "most despicable and inhuman tortures" suffered by the people of Zanzibar since the overthrow of the legal Government of Zanzibar by the "Chinese puppets" who have reduced the population to "abject poverty and misery". They have abolished the courts of law in favour of a judiciary manned by "party trustees", and Abeid Karume, "President" of Zanzibar, has recently called the revolution the *first and final election*, and told Zanzibaris in England: "We have gained power by means of force, so we will remain in power until the same befalls us."

No wonder that a *Daily Telegraph* editorial, commenting on the predicament in which the Privy Council judgment has placed the Rhodesian judges, says that "It is one of the inconsistencies of British policy towards the Smith régime that it does not always seem to know whether it wants law and order to continue in Rhodesia or whether it wants to destroy them". I should have thought that the terrorists gave the answer to this question.

—H.S.

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of imperialism in all countries. The revolution is spreading beyond the confines of one country; the period of world revolution has commenced.

"The main forces of the revolution: the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, the revolutionary movement of the proletariat in all countries.

"Main reserves: the semi-proletarian and small-peasant masses in all countries.

"Direction of the main blow: isolation of the petty-bourgeois democrats, isolation of the parties of the Second International, which constitute the main support of the policy of *compromise* with imperialism. [The parties referred to are Labour, Social Democrat, etc.]

"Plan for the disposition of forces: alliance of the proletarian revolution with the liberation movement in the colonies and the dependent countries."

In support and furtherance of this strategy, the Central Committee of the Communist Party set up training establishments, notably the Lenin University. To these establishments come selected students from all over the world; and the instruction for the more promising students extends over several years, and besides basic instruction in revolutionary technique, and leadership and initiation into secrets not disclosed to the general population of Russia, it includes attachment to the personal staffs of the principal leaders, and important missions to other countries. Naturally, the 'graduates' of such comprehensive training are highly qualified technician-diplomats. Many of them, on returning to their own countries, keep completely secret their Communist affiliations. These men (and women) are the Staff officers of international Communism, and of course also comprise the most comprehensive and efficient intelligence network the world has ever seen. Because of the secrecy, personnel of this Army can be infiltrated into the most sensitive positions. It is certain that no Cabinet secret in the world is unknown to the Kremlin, the Operations Room of a global strategy.

It goes without saying that the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., the General Staff of World Communism, consists

of the more brilliant products of this careful and intensive training; and it is more than likely that former members of the German General Staff, to whom world conquest is more a theoretical than a national problem, are included for their specialist knowledge of global strategy. The 'economic' theories of Communism are the opium of the proletariat and the professors.

It is also true that on Staff Officer levels, there is no such thing as a Czech Communist, though there may be such Officers of Czech origin.

When, following the end of the Second World War, and in consequence of the Yalta Agreement, the Russians mopped up Eastern and Central Europe, they appeared to present an immediate military menace to the rest of Europe. In further consequence, Europe's defences were organised in the system of N.A.T.O.; and, particularly with U.S. monopoly, and, later, superiority (now diminishing), the threat was "contained".

In the period which followed, there was never any suggestion that the West generally, let alone any country individually, would initiate a war with the U.S.S.R., or even attempt to 'free' any of its so-called satellites. The U.S.S.R. nevertheless maintained large armies, and proceeded with arms production of all descriptions on the largest scale, and supplied arms to liberation movements in the colonies in accordance with the "plan for the disposition of forces".

As a result of the creation of the State of Israel, the Arab countries became alienated from the West; and Russia took advantage of this situation to pour arms into the Middle East. And whatever the rights or wrongs of the Israeli-Arab war of June 1967, it afforded Russia the opportunity of stock-piling enormous quantities of the most modern heavy equipment as well as advisers in the vital Middle East area, and of establishing a formidable naval presence in the Mediterranean, serviced from abandoned Western bases.

Sir John Glubb (Glubb Pasha) in *The Middle East Crisis* (1967) has drawn attention to the critical importance of logistics in modern war. This is because war is fought with heavy vehicles, which require large supplies of spares, and base facilities for service and maintenance. So although troops can be concentrated in given positions by air in a matter of hours, their heavy equipment and its support cannot be so moved, much less serviced. Thus, the problem of contemporary logistics is essentially one of *pre-positioning*.

Churchill called Southern (Mediterranean) Europe the "soft under-belly of Europe". Russia has taken advantage of the turmoil arising in the Middle East created by the Israeli-Arab confrontation to make what might be described as a "blocking move" to isolate the Central European situation from any practicable approach from the Mediterranean, should the security of Western Europe come into question. A Communist insurrection in Italy would destroy the logistic capability of the U.S. Mediterranean fleet.

All this, in necessarily brief summary, forms the background of any consideration of the 'blunder' committed by the men of the Kremlin in 'occupying' Czechoslovakia.

It must constantly be borne in mind that it is the Communists themselves who assert that they aim at world victory—*i.e.*, world conquest. Hitler claimed more limited aims, but eventually he was not believed. He was believed

to be bent on world conquest, and the world embarked on a five-year war to stop him.

Nazi Germany's attack on the Soviet Union was an attempt to secure the Heartland, and it failed. But the Soviet Union's counter-attack, via the Yalta agreement, was successful; the Heartland passed virtually bloodlessly (not counting massacres and deportations) into the secure hands of the Communists; and by a skilful manipulation of the Middle East situation, which might have been made to order for their purposes, they have denied the Mediterranean to the West. And the Arabs, who hate the West for supporting the Israelis, control the West's oil supplies.

And then there is France's defection from NATO—another “blocking move”.

Is it possible for the Communists to conquer Europe . . . and without a five-year war? To do so, they would have to achieve a decisive shift in the balance of power. Is this possible?

On the evidence available, I believe this shift has been accomplished by carefully planned and brilliantly executed deception.

Andrew Wilson (*Observer*, Sept. 8, 1968) reports: “Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia 20 Russian divisions faced West Germany, plus two in Poland, and four in Hungary. Now there are something like 35. About 15 are in Czechoslovakia and are being deployed near the Bavarian border.

“The rest are in East Germany—mostly replacements, from western Russia, of forces that moved against Czech cities.

“In addition, according to NATO Intelligence estimates, there are now ‘several hundred’ Russian combat aircraft in Czechoslovakia, where there were none before.

“This increase, with Polish, East German and Hungarian troops, gives the Russians a three-to-one superiority against the 26 NATO divisions immediately in Europe. But no less important is an observed increase in the Warsaw Pact's combat readiness.”

A *Sunday Telegraph* editorial remarks: “Before August 21 it was NATO doctrine that it would take the East at least 30 days of mobilisation to establish such a numerical superiority on the ground as to justify an invasion of Western Europe. Those 30 days, it was calculated, having regard to NATO's advantage in the air, would be sufficient for the build-up of equalising reinforcements from the United States.

“As it happened, the Warsaw Pact mobilisation, so far as NATO intelligence was concerned, was completed in 30 hours, not 30 days. Russian tanks were suddenly on the Bavarian border, backed by a quarter of a million men.”

We may be certain that the Kremlin knew exactly what NATO's ‘calculations’ were, and are.

R. H. C. Steed, on the basis of a study of the British forces in Germany, has written two articles for the *Daily Telegraph* (Sept. 6 and 7, 1968). He writes: “The Czech invasion has shown that the Russian forces are ahead of Western estimates of them in speed of mobilisation and concentration, in air and land mobility and in staff work. The co-operation of the satellite armies has come as a warning not to under-estimate their usefulness under ‘jackal mentality’ conditions which the Russians would try to create for them in any conflict with NATO—the prospect of being on the winning side, of getting booty, of settling national scores, and above all of ‘eliminating the German danger’.

“NATO had also underestimated the extent to which the Russians would assemble troops in peacetime under the guise of manœuvres, and the simplicity with which real intentions could, if necessary, be concealed.”

Mr. Steed also points out that while the overall Russian superiority is three-to-one, they could rapidly achieve a ten-to-one superiority at a given point—say, against the British. What is the British logistic situation?

The *Daily Telegraph* Staff Correspondent reported (Sept. 2, 1968) “the rapid massing of 600,000 Russian and East European troops in Czechoslovakia”. He also reported that during the crisis the withdrawal of 35,000 American troops from Germany continued—“and should be completed on time before the end of next month”.

Military experts have stated that such was the precision and efficiency of the Russian troop movements that the operation must have taken six months to plan. What are the Russian plans for next month?

If there had been no ‘liberalisation’ programme in Czechoslovakia, what would NATO have said of these efficient troop dispositions? What was said when the Nazis occupied Bohemia?

To me, it is inescapable that a brilliantly stage-managed ‘revolt’ in Czechoslovakia has enabled the Communists to gain a decisive advantage in terms of ‘conventional’ war. What of nuclear war?

Since the Russians are in Czechoslovakia, tactical nuclear weapons cannot be used against them without at the same time using them against the Czechoslovaks. And when the Russians penetrate West Germany (which they can now do, fast and far, without warning, and particularly with the aid of local Communist subversive activity, which, of course, has been preparing for this move), tactical nuclear weapons would have to be used against the West Germans.

It is being said that NATO will have to “re-think” its strategy. Does anyone really suppose that, having gained a decisive advantage, that supreme ingredient of successful military strategy—surprise—the Communists will sit down quietly and watch NATO repair the damage?

No. The reality which underlies the Czechoslovak ‘crisis’ is as Mr. Steed states it: “There has been a sudden collapse of the whole body of assumptions on which the almost suicidal run-down of NATO has been based—reliance on the *détente*, belief in Russian good faith and in the political and economic liberalisation of Russian Communism, and confidence that ‘timely, possibly prolonged warning’ would be received of any threatening moves.”

But there is worse, again in Mr. Steed's words: “As things are now, the splendid British Army in Germany, as part of an Alliance that is without sufficient strength, reserves, or faith in itself, is exposed by the politicians either to the risk of fighting and dying to no purpose or else of seeing the things for which it is prepared to fight and die betrayed by surrender, sudden or piecemeal.”

Betrayed? Have we traitors amongst us? If we have, our one hope would be to impeach them, if we have time.

For world conquest has always been a human aspiration; and now, unless American citizens are prepared to have their cities atom-bombed for the problematical redemption of Europe, it is on the brink of fulfilment. The nuclear umbrella has been blown inside out.