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In South Africa

The following, continuing the account of some of the problems in South Africa, is taken from a tape-recording of the impressions of a Londoner recently resident for four years in that country. His vivid descriptions need to be set against the reports appearing in the Press, to correct the picture which is being presented to us—in the interests of International Finance and Communism.

Here's another situation. You are living here and next door you have a black family. Not all black families do it, but they might have one gramophone record and they play that one all day and night, the same one incessantly. When it is worn out they play the worn-out record; and that goes on for hours and hours. Now, on the trains. You will be sitting in the carriage where they can travel on the same trains in the Cape Province—out comes a chap with his mealy-meal, his pot. Oh, he must have his mealy-meal, although he has been civilised as a European for some time—doesn't want European food—mealy-meal, best thing, makes him strong—so he brings out his old tin, he's got his mealy-meal there, and they all squat down on the carriage floor and all tuck in. They're happy. They have got their own type of food and to us it is most revolting. When they finish, oh, just chuck the tin underneath the seat. It is a closed carriage and one feels that it is time for the toilet—out of the window, or on the floor—unless the conductor comes along and catches them and there is hell to pay, but you wouldn't like that kind of thing happening here? You may be with your wife and a chap there—out of the window—well, it offends our sense of decency—to them it is purely a natural action because they have been brought up differently, consequently most of the States other than Cape Province separate whites and blacks. They can do what they like in their own trains, they can do what they like in their own buses. It is going to be a long time before you can get them to behave differently.

You may be sitting in the cinema—someone will come in who doesn't wash. He will sit next to you. You can just imagine the stink of oil that they use to keep their skins in nice condition. You can't smoke in the cinema, so your whole enjoyment has gone. Or there might be a musical on. They will start singing their own words to it and chanting **Errrrrrrrr**. . . . You've lost your enjoyment. Or say they were living above you. Instead of putting their refuse in the tin they would throw it out of the window. That might be on your lawn; you would soon have a nice pile of old tins and rubbish. You go up and complain. "Oh, tin? Where? Where's tin? No, not ours, we don't throw tins out there." You go down and sit on the lawn and look up at the window and another tin comes sailing down. You rush up. "What tin? Where? We do not know anything about that tin." That is the sort of thing that happens. Or they would keep their refuse up there for weeks and suddenly one day—"Oh,

well push it down the stairs, it doesn't matter, it is only down stairs." Whoosh, and the lot comes down. On top of that get all the flies. Well, you know what flies are. You are in trouble all the time.

Apartheid is something not just thought up, trumped up to make life irksome for them. It cuts both ways. Hygiene, health reasons, also it helps to keep down the marriage of black and white. It also helps to keep together tribal life because it also insists that the native marries within his tribe, not outside of his tribe. If twelve or fourteen tribes all start intermarrying, the whole tribal structure in ten years would gradually disappear. And the loss of tribal structure leads to disorders. If Ned Kelly's sister has gone and married a fellow who lives over there, feuding starts. The whole structure of the tribe will disappear; and some of these tribes in the various things they do are really picturesque; their speech is different, you get a dialect of it which is a little different.

All kinds of things help to preserve the African way of life. John Gunther, in his *Inside Africa*, deals at length with all these things—in his short time there he delved out a terrific amount of information. He spent a few years there getting to the core of these things and using every available means to produce that work. What he found is very interesting, but in his brief time he really hasn't all the facts of everything that happens with regard to Apartheid, although he is very well-informed on the subject. Even in America, where the standard of education and civilisation of the native is higher than in other places, they try to keep the races separate, not only from a snobbish angle but for health reasons and a thousand others that go with these; and if they do it, how much more necessary in Africa. In England where the West Indians can come in freely and live they even make their own Apartheid by living in their own centres. They just don't scatter everywhere, they live in a community and that community is solely West Indian; they adopt the West Indian way of life. They marry each other—a few break out and marry the white people, that is more the exception than the rule—they marry between themselves generally.

You will find they have settled in Notting Hill, Kensington, Brixton in small communities, but it is not even by law that they have to do this thing. They have made it that way for their own comfort because they know their own people and they know that way of life. They like that way of life and they develop their communities that way. You see, it is even practised by themselves unconsciously.

The fundamental attitude of the South African Government towards the native is to regard them purely as a 100% labour force—to keep them as a labour force with the white man dominantly supreme in all aspects of life. The natives are encouraged to form their own government, but not within

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Cuba And The United States

U.S. News and World Report, September 26, 1960, publishes some excerpts from the transcript of a hearing by the Senate Internal Security Sub-committee made public on September 11, 1960. It relates to evidence given by Mr. Earl E. T. Smith, who was the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba during Castro's rise.

Mr. Smith informed the Committee that he was briefed in Washington for six weeks prior to his taking up his appointment; he was also instructed to get a briefing from Herbert L. Matthews of the *New York Times*, who in February, 1957, published three front page articles on Fidel Castro, in which he eulogised Castro and portrayed him as a political Robin Hood.

We would recommend our readers who have access to *U.S. News and World Report* to read all the extracts from the transcript published therein. The following quotations give the sense of the evidence.

Mr. Smith: Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee . . . I have prepared the following brief statement:

First let me say that to date I have made no public statement regarding my experiences in Cuba because I did not feel that, as a former Ambassador, it was my function to say anything which might be interpreted as critical of the Administration which I had served. I have only the greatest respect and admiration for President Eisenhower, whose integrity is beyond question.

However, the establishment of a Communist régime in Cuba involves the defense and safety of this country and, as you asked me to testify before you, I do so, recognising that the welfare of the United States must transcend personal desires and reticence.

From personal experience I have learned that many very influential sources in the United States are dedicated to the overthrow of all dictatorships. They are as opposed to

anti-Communist rightist dictators who are friendly to the United States as to the Communist dictators, whom they regard as progressive. They adopt a doctrinaire attitude toward this question which is so impractical that they ultimately unwittingly defeat themselves. If dictatorship versus democracy were the only question that faced us, it would not be difficult to make a decision. However, as we are in the midst of a struggle for survival, other considerations are pertinent.

If the policy of the United States is to bring about the overthrow of dictators in the hope that democracy will follow, then I believe that the United States must be prepared to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve law and order and prevent chaos during that interim period of transition.

If free and open elections are to be held, when a dictator is overthrown a provisional government must be formed, and such government needs outside support to maintain law and order. To do otherwise leaves a vacuum for the Communists to gain control. Such a vacuum did not occur in Cuba while I was the U.S. Ambassador there. Instead, a group was ready to seize power—a Communist group.

If we are to intervene sufficiently to bring about the overthrow of dictatorships, then we should intervene to whatever extent is required to fulfil our purpose. Otherwise, in my opinion, we must wait for the normal self-development of a people and not assist revolution. And we must be prepared to receive the criticism of supporting friendly governments recognised by the United States, although they have been labelled dictatorships. To make my point more clear, let me say that we helped to overthrow the Batista dictatorship, which was pro-American only to install the Castro dictatorship, which is pro-Russian.

Senator Eastland (Chairman of the Subcommittee): Mr. Smith, we have had hearings, a great many, in Miami, with prominent Cubans, and there is a thread that runs through the whole thing: That people connected with some Government agency went to Cuba and called on the chiefs of the armed forces and told them that we should not recognise the Government of the President-elect, and that we would not back him, and that, because of that, the chiefs of the armed forces told Batista to leave the country, and they set up a Government in which they attempted to make a deal with Castro. That is accurate, isn't it?

Senator Dodd: I would say so, yes.

Senator Eastland: That thread runs through the whole series of hearings. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. Smith: It is not as simple as that, Senator Eastland. You are talking now about Rivero Aguero, who was elected November 3, 1958, as President of Cuba.

Senator Eastland: Yes.

Mr. Smith: Let me just read, if I may, something that I wrote here that I may publish and may not—this is part of it—which will answer part of your question. I will have to go back over it step by step, because what you have heard, Senator Eastland, is partly true and partly untrue.

Senator Eastland: Yes.

Mr. Smith: I have been asked many times what part, if any, the United States played in the Castro and Communist rise to power in Cuba. The U.S. Government agencies and the U.S. press played a major role in bringing Castro to power.

Three front-page articles in the *New York Times* in early 1957, written by the editorialist Herbert Matthews, served to inflate Castro to world stature and world recognition. Until that time, Castro had been just another bandit in the Oriente Mountains of Cuba, with a handful of followers who had terrorised the campesinos, that is, the peasants, throughout the countryside.

Fidel Castro landed on the south coast of Oriente in December of 1956 from Mexico with an expeditionary force of 81 men. Intercepted by Cuban gunboats and patrol planes, Castro and a handful of stragglers managed to ensconce themselves in the rugged 8,000-foot Sierra Maestra Range.

After the Matthews articles, which followed an exclusive interview by the *Times* editorial writer in Castro's mountain hideout and which likened him to Abraham Lincoln, he was able to get followers and funds in Cuba, and in the United States. From that time on, arms, money and soldiers of fortune abounded. Much of the American press began to picture Castro as a political Robin Hood.

Also, because Batista was the dictator who unlawfully seized power, American people assumed Castro must, on the other hand, represent liberty and democracy. The crusader role which the press and radio bestowed on the bearded rebel blinded the people to the left-wing political philosophy with which even at that time he was on record.

His speeches as a student leader, his interviews as an exile while in Mexico, Costa Rica and elsewhere clearly outlined a Marxist trend of political thought.

The official U.S. attitude toward Castro could not help but be influenced by the pro-Castro press and radio; certain members of Congress picked up the torch for him.

From there, to get back to your question, there were a number of times, number of occasions when I was asked as the Ambassador if we would help the Church in its efforts to establish a bridge between Castro and Batista, or if we, in any way, would support a national-unity government. Such government would act as a provisional government in Cuba to maintain law and order while elections were being held.

The United States would never agree to support or would never permit me to negotiate, because it would be considered as intervening in the internal affairs of Cuba.

... It is true, in reply to your question, Senator, that the U.S. Government instructed me through the State Department to say that we would not give aid and support to the Rivero Aguero Government when installed because we did not feel that he would maintain effective control of the country.

As far as the disintegration of the armed forces around the Batista Government, the answer to your last question is that this negative action helped shatter the morale of the existing Government. The responsibility for the deterioration in the morale of the Army, Navy and Cuban Air Force dates back to many other forms of direct and indirect—I use the word “intervention” advisedly.

Primarily, I would say that when we refused to sell arms to the Cuban Government and also, by what I termed intervening by innuendo—which was persuading other friendly governments not to sell arms to Cuba—that these actions had a moral, psychological effect upon the Cuban armed forces which was demoralising to the nth degree.

The reverse: It built up the morale of the revolutionary forces. Obviously, when we refused to sell arms to a friendly

Government, the existing Government, the people of Cuba and the armed forces knew that the United States no longer would support Batista's Government.

It is also true, and I believe that I can confirm the story now because the following story was reported by associates of Batista. Further, I was asked by the press last winter to comment on whether we had told Batista to leave the country. At that time I refused to answer the question and referred all comments to the State Department.

It is also true that, upon instructions, I spent two hours and thirty-five minutes on December 17, 1958, with Batista, and I told him that the United States, or rather certain influential people in the United States, believed that he could no longer maintain effective control in Cuba, and that they believed it would avoid a great deal of further bloodshed if he were to retire.

Senator Eastland: That was on instructions of the State Department?

Mr. Smith: An Ambassador never would have a conversation like that, sir, unless it was on instructions of the State Department.

Senator Eastland: Yes.

Senator Eastland: It is your judgment that the State Department of the United States is primarily responsible for bringing Castro to power in Cuba?

Mr. Smith: No, sir, I can't say that the State Department in itself is primarily responsible. The State Department played a large part in bringing Castro to power, the press, other Government agencies, members of Congress are responsible.

Senator Eastland: Would you say that the American Government there, including all of its agencies was largely responsible for bringing Castro to power?

Mr. Smith: The American Government, yes, sir, and the people in the American Government.

Senator Eastland: Your advices were that it was not in the best interest of the United States for Castro to come to power?

Mr. Smith: Yes, sir.

Senator Eastland: And yet, in spite of that, of your advices to our Government, you say that our Government was primarily responsible in bringing Castro to power.

Mr. Smith: That is absolutely correct.

Until the advent of Castro, the United States was so overwhelmingly influential in Cuba that . . . the American Ambassador was the second most important man in Cuba, sometimes even more important than the President.

That is because of the reason of the position that the United States played in Cuba. Now, today, his importance is not very great. I think there is one point I would like to bring up, Senator, and that is the recognition of Castro.

It has always been the policy of the U.S. Government not to be one of the first or one of the last to recognise a friendly Government. It has always been the policy of the U.S. Government, before they recognised a new Government, to be sure of the following—I do not place them in order of their importance, but they are:

(a) If a Government is Communist or too much infiltrated with Communism.

(b) Whether a Government will honour its international obligations.

(c) That the new Government can maintain law and order. And we always hope that they have the support of the people.

In this case, I believe that we were very hasty in the recognition of the Castro Government.

. . . . Then, as soon as I arrived in Washington, they told me that we were going to recognise the new Government, and I was to rush back and do it.

I think it was approximately about five days—the fifth, or let's say around the sixth, of January. At that time Castro had not even arrived in Havana. Castro was still out in the eastern parts of the island, wending his way towards Havana.

I am sorry that we did not take more pains in trying to insure that Castro would honor his international obligations before we recognised him.

I think we were very hasty in our recognition.

IN SOUTH AFRICA (cont. from page 1.)

the next twenty years. They have to produce themselves leaders who will be unbiassed towards anyone but also have to prove themselves leaders. Although some of these boys in their political way of life are leaders, their leadership also contains their little private armies that well "We are the boss of this district—good, we will go over and beat up Jo over there because we are stronger. When we've got to Jo we will beat up those others." No, they don't want that kind of leadership—they want a political leadership of logic for the native. At the moment his logic is Might is Right. In the cities, especially Jo'burg, you have native gangs which are a very serious problem. We call them bodgies and things like that here, but to these little gangs, Might is Right. They go and beat each other up and they do a robbery and things like that to get cash; and it is very serious. You see, the Government does not want that type of leadership—they want a leadership that can govern, that can show a logical way of thought. At the moment, Might is Right by being strongest, not by argument or by way of our conventions; and it will take a good twenty years before that is overcome. They have some leaders, they have some educated men but, I am sorry to say, quite a number of the educated men exploit their own fellows for their own ends and that is a very sorry fact, very sorry.

The Government is not animated by any ill will. Admittedly the Nationalist Government that is in power now is very extreme rightist in the belief that the white man is supreme, whereas the old party, the Unionist Party, was more tolerant towards the black man.

You see, the predominant factors of the Nationalist are of old Boer origin. They remember such facts as the Battle of Blood River—Dedegan, that was the Zulu uprising, so much so that they make days like Anzac Day and Commemoration Day here of those days. On Dedegan's Day, if I was a black man, I wouldn't go to the streets at all, especially in strongholds of any Nationalist Government. You have areas where the Nationalist people are predominant—on those days for coloured men—"out and stay out." It has been drilled into those Boers—Dedegan, remember the black man, they rose against us and killed everyone from a certain spot to a certain spot. I think

they started way north of Transvaal and they swept, I think it was five hundred miles and killed every white person in that sweep.

And that could *easily* happen again and these Nationalists always remember. It has been passed down as a feud and it is a dominant factor in their lives. Blood River was when the Boer trekkers were coming up from Cape Town, and they came to the Blood River and were fording across and the Zulus surrounded the whole lot of them and just wiped them out, the whole convoy, the whole party of Boer trekkers. I think there were about three thousand there, they killed the lot; and the memory of those things which happened to these early Dutch people has been passed down the generations. They still remember such things as the Boer War and that is a very bitter memory too. Mr. Strijdom was more tolerant, he was a diplomat and he had a nucleus of government around him that was similar but these present boys, unfortunately, are extremists, which is making life very difficult for all and sundry—not only for the black men, or shall we say not so much black man but native, for there are immigrants that have come in of other nationalities. The Nationalists only understand the Boer way of life and that is the way of life—like old Paul Kruger, the old Paul there, the old Bull Frog . . . oomp, oomp—there was only one person in the world, the Boer. Admittedly some of the things that the Boer fathers began years ago, such as town planning, are bearing fruit today—the wide streets, building houses well apart—are paying off but in other things the Boer influence is a deterrent to the country. In fact when I went there I was prepared to spend the rest of my life there. It was a beautiful country, you could earn money—as in any other country if you work hard—and the climate suited me. I was quite happy, but I saw viciousness coming from the Boer and I knew that sooner or later there would be trouble. If I had to go back to Africa tomorrow, it would not worry me. I would be quite happy to go back because the native is a happy soul.

(To be continued)

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