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FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

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From Week to Week

The *Vancouver Province* publishes a telegram from London (England) stating that British farmers are to get American loans next year. A "revolving loan" fund has been created to a maximum of \$840,000 from which money (? dollars) will be available to small and medium sized agricultural enterprises. The terms are to be 4% interest, the principal repayable in three to four years [In dollars?].

The term "revolving loan" is explained by stating that as capital and interest flow back, the accumulations will be again available for relending.

If British bankers did this, of course British farmers would not be able to buy American tractors with the 'money'—however, they may be able to do business lending the four *per cent.* interest. Or possibly the Ministry of Agriculture will persuade the nationalised Bank of England to lend pounds to Americans to buy machinery made at Ipswich.

On October 30 a new weekly "views-letter" will appear, made possible by "a group of patriots who have found the money necessary to start it." The letter will be called *Candour*, and it will be published by the Candour Publishing Company, 857, Fulham Road, S.W.6. The annual subscription will be 50/- (open envelope), 55/- (closed envelope). In an introductory circular the promise is made that the publication will not hesitate to affirm "that the attack on the British Empire, and on the sovereignty of the historic nations of Western Europe, is being carried out, not by the Empire of Moscow but by the Empire of International Finance directed from New York and Washington. *Candour* will fearlessly assert—and will hope to prove—that the dominant Financial Power uses as its chief agents the United States Government, the United Nations, the International Bank and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, and that in the past it has given active support to the Soviet Union, which may even be said to be its own creation. If the British nations are to maintain their independence they must wrest their sovereignty from the rule of this Colossus. Otherwise the British Empire will pass ingloriously from the pages of history."

We may be wrong, but we deem it of even greater value that, "while avoiding ideological disputations, [*Candour*] will give general support to the thesis that a sane and Christian social order depends on the overthrow of the present nightmare system of public debt in favour of a system of public credit, and that the small man and the small firm must be protected against the hungry giants of Collectivism and Monopoly Capitalism, now often united in unholy wedlock."

While disputation, 'Ideological' or otherwise, does not, it seems, lead anywhere particularly, it is not unimportant

that "a" system of credit should be completely realistic in the sense which this review has consistently urged. The real universe runs (or will cease to run) on facts, not on formulæ, however seductive. If *Candour* can break through the political sound-barrier with this news, it will do a great service.

A good deal of the earlier support of Douglas (1920-30) was due to the *entrepreneur* and mercantilist interest bound up with the discovery of "a good thing"—*i.e.*, a good thing for anyone with something to send, or take, to the market with the hope of selling it. That it was also good for anyone approaching the market from another angle was so much the better: the market would be all the brisker. The outcome was the after-the-race attitude of the man who backs a good horse which isn't placed: if it ran again, he might back it again. But, in the meantime, he sighs and backs something else. Indubitably, there are some superlatively good horses; but the consensus of the best opinion is that habitual backers neither make very much nor lose very much. Their betting is a side-line: they don't live on it.

Quite demonstrably the populations of the world do live on the relative success of their civilisations. Whatever it is, civilisation is not a side-line. If Social Credit has anything vital to contribute to civilisation, it isn't a side-line either. What it has that is vital to contribute is in the first place, in our opinion, an accurate diagnosis of the causes of the repeated breakdowns in the past. What is called "the cyclical theory," the theory that something unspecified has always produced an "eternal recurrence" of the same point of departure, the theory which summarises ancient experience (but not therefore "classical" in any real sense) and the theory of Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler, Toynbee (with reservations), is merely a statement of *observation*. Civilisations always *have* presented the appearance of being born, growing to maturity, decaying and passing away. But why?

Quite modestly we submit that it carried within itself the seeds of its own destruction, *which the historians have not identified*. We do not say "which the historians have not succeeded in identifying"; we can find no evidence that they have pursued the matter very attentively. What we suggest is that each decaying civilisation in turn has been afflicted with the consequences ensuing from a failure correctly to distinguish between Power and Authority and therefore the consequences of a failure to establish a correct relationship between them. If the gnostic tradition is so strong that it blinds even Social Crediters to the nature of their historic failing it is just so much the worse; but even that does not mean that "the eternal recurrence" is inevitable.

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Statistics Under Fire

Mr. W. Kenneth Richmond of Glasgow University contributes to the *British Journal of Psychology* for August a critique of measurements applied to education. This is a welcome departure from the triumphal march of the battalions of the slide-rule whose ascendancy dates in Mr. Richmond's opinion from at least the beginning of the reign of Lucifer, the birth of the Industrial Revolution.

How deeply embedded in the minds (not hearts) of modern efficiency-rearers is the idol of the office and the bank-parlour, figures, may be observed by anyone who may ask a living pundit who glories in his marks or who deplors his students', "What is a mark?" Listen to the automatic recital of the procedure: There are available 100 (or a thousand, *i.e.*, ten 100's) and of the 100 (or thousand) a student must "obtain" 50 *per cent.* (*i.e.*, 50, as we should say, or 500). If he doesn't he hasn't "passed." If again it is asked "what is a mark?", the demonstration is repeated. What *is* a "mark"? No one has ever discovered more than that it is a hundredth part of 100—which, as the expression has it, "every schoolboy knows."

But to return to Mr. Richmond, his essay contains some good things. For example:—

"The Platonic distinction between *episteme* and *doxa* has disappeared."

"So successful has been the attempt to professionalise the study of education that anyone who ventures to question the efficacy of experimental-statistical techniques is liable to find himself dismissed as a tiresome amateur."

"Judging by the way things are going, it may be feared that the gap between 'educational research' and 'educational thought,' not to mention the gap between research and general practice in the schools, is steadily widening and that in time it may result in an open breach."

"Science, it has been said, should not be used so parochially as to exclude theories unpatronized [*sic*] by the Royal Society." Ah, yes; patronage and science are a conjunction not yet explored. "The trouble about modern science is that it has proved highly successful in extending man's control over nature without adding to his understanding of nature . . . The climate of opinion being what it is, most of us must doff our caps to those who use a formidable statistical jargon, but assuredly the day will come when, once again, it will be acknowledged that the language of 'mere descriptive words' is capable of refinements which are not to be despised and appraisals which no predicational arithmetic can compass."

Perhaps, after all "though the battle be lost, all is not lost."

Deviations

by H. SWABEY.

I.

The identification of Christianity with failure is, according to Major Douglas, one of the most remarkable features of the grand strategy of Evil. In face of it, it becomes all the more urgent to discover what is identified with Christianity.

The following opinion by Dante, written about 1300 in *De Monarchia*, may startle those living in the slave state era, but we should probably agree with it. "The work proper to the human race," he says, "taken as a whole, is to keep the whole capacity of the potential intellect constantly actualised, primarily for speculation, and secondarily (by extension, and for the sake of the other) for action. And since . . . it is the fact that in sedentary quietness the individual man is perfected in knowledge and wisdom, it is evident that in the quiet or tranquillity of peace the human race is most freely and favourably disposed towards the work proper to it . . . Whence it is manifest that universal peace is the best of all those things which are ordained for our blessedness." The translator compares Ecclesiasticus 38, 24: 'The wisdom of a learned man cometh by opportunity of leisure; and he that hath little business shall become wise.'

But we shall not follow Dante in his next step, for he argues—using the analogy of the family, *etc.*—that to ensure peace "there must be one guiding or ruling power. And this is what we mean by monarch or emperor." Glanvil and Bracton had already contributed to the theory that the king is under the law, and the English Common Law and three fold Constitution were well advanced. Besides, experience shews that a monarchy of this huge type does not bring the desirable conditions which Dante has outlined. (See W. Lewis's *The Writer and The Absolute*.) Some confusion between power and authority may be seen. Nor, from the analogy of an army, should we agree that "the order of the parts with reference to that unity is the superior order, as being the end of the other." The human parts do not exist for the sake of the whole. When he takes a theological twist, Dante stresses the unity of God, but omits the trinitarian nature of the godhead. A faulty notion of power together with over-reliance on syllogisms, leads Dante to argue that since "the monarch has nought that he can desire . . . the monarch may be the purest subject of justice among mortals," to prevent greed opposing justice.

Dante then states that "the human race when most free is best disposed . . . The first principle of our freedom is freedom of choice . . . Judgment is the link between apprehension and appetite . . . Brutes cannot have free judgment because their judgments are always anticipated by appetite . . . This freedom is the greatest gift conferred by God on human nature." And, he says, the human race is most free under a monarch, for then the human race exists for its own sake. The argument needs watching. For when he goes on to say that only then are perverted forms of government—democracies, oligarchies, tyrannies ("which force the human race into slavery")—made straight, and only then is government conducted by kings, aristocrats and by "zealots for the people's liberty," he has made a case for the element of personal rule, but not for monarchy. For a monarch would not at all necessarily have "love of men

in the highest degree." Again we agree that right governments "purpose freedom, to wit that men should exist for their own sakes . . . albeit the consul or king be masters of the rest as regards the way, yet as regards the end they are their servants; and the monarch most of all, for he must assuredly be regarded as the servant of all."

The character required of this master-servant regulator of the race has Confucian affiliations. He cannot eliminate greed from his subjects, as Wicksteed the translator puts it, unless he is himself genuinely free from it. "Greed," says Dante, "is the sole corrupter of judgment and impeder of justice." But six hundred and fifty years have not quite demonstrated the bald proposition that "the human race can be ruled by one supreme prince who is the monarch," and we have no evidence that "the monarch cannot have any occasion for greed." Nor is Pythagoras necessarily right in placing 'unity' on the side of good and 'plurality' on the side of evil. Dante instances Augustus ("when there was perfect monarchy, and universal peace") as the ideal, or the time as ideal. Mommsen, the German historian, significantly enough attributed perfection to Julius Caesar. Dante appeals to history for evidence of the calamities suffered "since that seamless garment first suffered rending by the nail of covetousness."

Dante argues in his middle section that Rome was divinely appointed to rule the world. "For nature is in the mind of the first mover, which is God . . . good exists primarily in the mind of God." He quotes the Old Testament here and there, and bears the Roman law in mind. "The end of every society is the good of those associated

. . . Wherefore Tully well says in the first of the *Rhetoric*: 'The laws are ever to be interpreted to the good of the commonwealth.' He also makes the strange quotation: 'The Roman Empire springs from the fount of compassion.' Yet his doctrine approaches the idea that might is right, and references to the ordeal—an accretion from abroad on English common law—does not much exalt the argument. At the end of this book, he turns on presumptuous jurists and greedy clergy: "The very patrimony of the church is daily plundered."

The work is relevant at a time when Moscow, the third Rome, and Washington are apparently disputing for the allegiance of mankind. The absurd praises given to emperors will cause no surprise if we reflect on the fate of Ovid, who somehow fell out with the court. Dante or Mommsen would see little but flattering accounts of the monarchs Julius Caesar and Augustus. In our day, few Russians could read anything but praise of their monarchs; and the position of Ezra Pound, who criticised Roosevelt, has resembled Ovid's.

But in the last book, on account of which the work was banned, Dante argues against the monopoly of those who "assert that the authority of the empire depends upon the authority of the church." He says that "authority accrues not to the church from the traditions, but to the traditions from the church." The Donation—i.e., gift of lands—of Constantine to the church he holds was invalid. Regarding the persons of pope and emperor, he says that they must be reduced to one standard as men, "that to which they must be reduced as pope and emperor is another." That is, he differentiates between Authority and Power. In his day, the pope as representing Authority was claiming Power as well. In our time, Power respects no Authority, or at most uses it as an agency.

The translator says that Dante's final chapter is the key to the structure of the *Comedy*. In it he tries to show that the emperor is directly authorised by God. To do this, he rather dangerously divides man into mortal and immortal. Providence has "set two ends before man"—terrestrial and celestial—which he must reach "by diverse means." Reason and the Holy Spirit supply these means. "Yet would human greed cast them behind were not men, like horses going astray in their brutishness, held in the way by bit and rein." So man needs a twofold directive power, embodied in the supreme pontiff and the emperor. This is an argument for Law, not for arbitrary power. Few, he continues, could reach the goal of temporal felicity "were not the waves of seductive greed assuaged and the human race left free to rest in the tranquillity of peace." The Roman prince should aim at enabling the race to live in freedom and peace, and at applying the charters "which conduce to liberty and peace." The electors of the emperor (German princes) should be reckoned as the heralds of divine providence. Dissent among them arises because they are "clouded by the mists of greed"

Dante ends on a pleasant note. "Let Caesar observe that reverence to Peter which a first-born son should observe to a father, so that illuminated by the light of paternal grace he may with greater power irradiate the world . . ." But however excellent the end described, the means—tainted both with monarchy and dualism—have never achieved it and never would.

II.

Niccolò Machiavelli served the Republic of Florence for fourteen years until the return of the Medici in 1512, when he was banished. He wrote *The Prince* in exile and presented it to the ruler (1513). He was recalled and employed until the Medici were again expelled, in 1527.

In *The Prince* Machiavelli commends the policies which had ruined Florence, Italy, the Church and Christendom. He contrasts a hereditary ruler, who will not have much occasion for oppression, with a usurper whose first care must be the extirpation of the reigning house. He must watch, noting that "whoever is the occasion of another's advancement is the cause of his own diminution." The Romans had trouble with France, Spain and Greece "by reason of the many principalities in those several kingdoms." And from this we may gather that the principle of the distribution of power within a country is a source of strength to that country, that plurality will guard sovereignty. This links the tyrant and the leveller, the monopolist and the agitator. The Spartans, says Machiavelli, made a mistake when they tried to keep Greece "by allowing them their liberty, and indulging their old laws." The Romans preserved their conquests, such as Carthage, by destruction. It follows that liberty and old laws make for independence.

Machiavelli recommends the Old Testament prophets "whose arms were in their hands, and had power to compel." And he holds up Caesar Borgia the brutal son of pope Alexander VI, as an ideal prince. He secured himself "by destroying the whole line of those lords whom he had dispossessed," and told Machiavelli that he had provided against any accident that might happen at his father's death. Machiavelli says, "I see nothing to be reprehended; it seems rather proper to me to propose him, as I have done, as an example for the imitation of all such as by the favour of fortune, or the supplies of other princes, have got into the

saddle." This, he says, is the way to attain power and to keep it and Caesar Borgia is the model of those who would "overcome, whether by force or by fraud." We may learn from him what Power involves.

He balks at the barbarities of Agathocles of Sicily, yet adds that cruelty may be called well applied "when committed but once . . . He who usurps the government of any State is to execute and put in practice all the cruelties which he thinks material at once, that he may have no occasion to renew them often." Mastery in what he calls a civil principality is obtained "by a lucky sort of craft," and such a chieftain must preserve the affection of his people. A dexterous prince will maintain their loyalty in war, "sometimes inculcating and possessing them with the cruelty of the enemy." Among ecclesiastical princes, Alexander VI "demonstrated what a Pope with money and power was able to do." The barons of Rome were exterminated "and, besides, a way opened for raising and hoarding of money never practised before." He adds that good laws and good arms are the principal foundations of all States, and "there cannot be good laws where there are not good arms."

"A prince, then, is to have no other design, nor thought, nor study but war and the arts and disciplines of it." A tender man, and one that desires to be honest in everything, must needs run a great hazard among so many of a contrary principle. "Wherefore it is necessary for a prince who is willing to subsist to harden himself, and learn to be good or otherwise according to the exigence of his affairs." He must avoid the scandal of his vices, but is not to worry if the vices are such as to preserve his dominion. "Liberality so used as not to render you formidable does but injure you." All from whom he takes nothing will consider him noble. Julius XI "made use of his bounty" to obtain the papacy, but by his frugality he maintained several wars "without any tax or imposition upon the people." But a prince should not regard the scandal of being cruel "if thereby he keeps his subjects in their allegiance and united . . . it is better to be feared than beloved; for in the general men are ungrateful, inconstant, hypocritical, fearful of danger and covetous of gain. To be feared and not hated are compatible enough." The prince must be careful not to touch his subjects estates. Yet it was Hannibal's cruelty that kept his army together.

The prince "ought to imitate the lion and the fox." (One of Wyndham Lewis's unobtainable studies of Power is called *The Lion and the Fox*.) The wise and prudent prince "cannot or ought not to keep his parole . . . it is of great consequence to disguise your inclination and to play the hypocrite well. . . . Alexander VI never did nor thought of anything but cheating." He has little to fear while the people are his friends, but if they turn against him he should fear everyone and everything.

Curiously enough, he commends the French monarchy "where there are many good laws and constitutions tending to the liberty and preservation of the king." The king can play off the nobles against the people through the Parliament, and the system's founder "erected a third judge which should keep the nobility under and protect the people." In ancient Rome, the soldiers were another power. If the chief party, whether army, people or nobility, to whom the prince must look for his preservation, be corrupt, "you must follow their humour and indulge them, and in that case honesty and virtue are pernicious." He likens the government of the Soldans to the Papacy, as it can be called neither a new nor a hereditary principality. Hatred and contempt, he concludes, have always caused the downfall of emperors.

"A wise prince was never known to disarm his subjects." Overcoming difficulties demonstrates his greatness. Indeed, he adds, many people think that the prince should maintain some enmity against himself. "The best fortification of all is not to be hated by the people." Ferdinand, King of Aragon and Spain, recommended himself by his great enterprises. "Always making religion his pretence, by a kind of devout cruelty he destroyed and exterminated the Jews called Marrani, than which nothing could be more strange or deplorable. Under the same cloak of religion he invaded Africa, Italy . . . France. His enterprises gave no leisure to any man to be at quiet, or to continue anything against him."

Machiavelli warns against neutrality and recommends "a fair war." He advises, sensibly enough, that "a prince is never to league himself with another more powerful than himself . . . princes ought to be as cautious as possible of falling under the discretion of other people." Our politicians evidently have omitted attention to this section of the book, and the following in which the prince is told to encourage his subjects "to the end that one may not forbear improving or embellishing his estate for fear it should be taken from him, nor another advancing his trade in apprehension of taxes; but the prince is rather to excite them by propositions of reward, and immunities to all such as shall in any way amplify his territory or power." Taxation today penalises improvements.

He concludes with an exhortation to the Medici to deliver Italy from the foreigners, to put an end to the devastations in Lombardy, "the taxes and expropriations in the kingdom of Naples and Tuscany." Finally, he advises "Nothing makes so much to the honour of a new prince as new laws and new orders invented by him."

(To be concluded.)

"Bigger and Worse"

The Bulletin (Glasgow) for October 2 has a leading article, which opens with a quotation from the writings of Jonathan Swift satirising the pretensions of politicians, on the bigger and worse potato resulting from the activities of "Science" in alliance with state control: in this case artificial.

Lord Boyd Orr comes in for special mention as one "concerned with world rather than national needs."

"Who," asks *The Bulletin*, "applies the remedy? Is it the housewife, with a strike weapon ready to hand? Is it the Government? Or are the potato-growers going to be sensible enough to see the light quickly and to forestall other action? And maybe it wouldn't be a bad idea if the agricultural scientists themselves paused long enough occasionally to cook and taste the fruits of their experimental plots." Yes, "plots."

"Green, hard, big and bad in the middle" is a housewife's description of the available potato.

Scots Farmer Fights Power Plan

Mr. John Gray, 335-acre Kincardine farmer has refused to allow surveyors to make trial borings on his land where the British Electricity Authority hope to establish a new power station. He says he stands to lose 150 acres of "the best land in Scotland."

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